Kemetic Relations with the Animal Kingdom
Ancient Egypt’s ethical thought and moral ideal were a basis for living a good life, with the emphasis not on promoting the self as much as making oneself worthy. In this, there are three main areas where one must prove his or her worth: worthiness before the Divine, worthiness before others, and worthiness before Nature. This third aspect, a factor missing from many of today’s mainstream religious ideologies, is a central part of the interrelated order of Maat, and not separate from the Divine nor from people; in this framework, humans are seen as inherently connected with nature. (Karenga 2006, 381) This extends to the relationship this moral ideal has between humans and the animals they share the world with, and shows a respect and understanding for the nature of animals. “Of all the civilizations in the ancient world,” opens the Forward of An Egyptian Bestiary, “none enjoyed such a close and significant relationship with the animal realm as that of the ancient Egyptians” (Germond 7).
These relations stem back to Kemetic theology, where the Creator invested himself in all that exists. As stated in the Book of Knowing and Creations, Ra describes how, by coming into being, “being itself came into being.” The passage further notes that Ra “came forth from among the plants…and created all things which creep and crawl and all that exists among them” (Karenga 1984, 5). Ra, being invested in all things, establishes the connection between the Divine and the natural. Humans find their place as fellow beings created by God, though unique in that they are made in Ra’s image – mi Ra, or like Ra. Yet unlike the Judeo-Christian traditions, this special status does not grant humans mastery of the world and its resources. Rather, there is a sense of the unity of being, a shared essence essentially binding all life together, and filial guardianship making it a crucial element to live in harmony with the natural world as much as with other people. (Karenga 2006, 385-387, 391) Ra cares for all life, and is praised in the Book of Prayers and Sacred Praises as one “who make people and birds to live, who supplies even food for mice in their holes as well as for worms and fleas” (Karenga 1984, 15).
Animals, recognized as being a part of the greater whole, were to be treated with some measure of respect. Many texts allude to the nobility of animals, such as Unas declaration in the Pyramid Texts stating that no person living or dead and no bird or beast accuses him. (Karenga 2006, 382) The Papyrus of the Royal Mother Nezemt contains confessions that state “I have not slaughtered the divine cattle of the temple” and “I have not cut the hair and skin of divine animals” (Saleem 115, 116). The Book of Coming Forth By Day also allude to the fair treatment of certain animals: “I have not snared sacred birds. I have not caught fish with the bait of their own bodies…I have not driven away cattle from the property of God” (Karenga 1984, 110).
While this does demonstrate a general respect for the well being of animals, it does not advocate certain inherent rights. For example, in the narrative of Djedi (Karenga 2006, 318-319), the sage stands up for the moral right of a prisoner to not be experimented on, but has no problem with a duck being presented to him as a test subject. This is because, while humans still share their world with nature and are a part of it, there is no denying their special status as images of God. (Karenga 2006, 388-389) Still, the concept of fairness remains. Fairness to humans and fairness to animals exist on different levels in Kemetic thought, and as stated above mistreatment of animals is frowned on. It is more akin to reckless behavior that threatens the future of human life and the environment. (Karenga 2006, 394, 395) Humans are expected to be filial guardians of the natural world, enjoying its gifts while at the same time recognizing their interrelated nature of the world, caring for it as a dutiful son or daughter might care for a parent. (Karenga 2006, 391-395)
In the spiritual and symbolic realm, animals played a major role as divine images and exemplified aspects of certain ethical concepts. Many of the Egyptian deities were conceived as beings that are part human and part animal, reflecting the interconnectedness between the two. As Philippe Germond states, “any tendency to favor only the human form of any given divinity, at the expense of the original animal form, would have been fundamentally at odds with the basic tenants of Egyptian thinking at the time” (121). These spiritual representations state how sacredness is not just a human aspect, but an expression of all living beings which are one in the Creator. (Karenga 2006, 387) This further distances Maatian ethics from mindsets setting humans far above animals, and supports the unity of being.
In the divine region, animals come to play as various gods and goddesses, aspects of Ra, who is in all things. Anubis, associated with funerary rights and the being that mans the Scales of Maat during judgment in the afterlife, bears the head of a jackal, thus making the jackal a divine representation of death. (Karenga 2006, 139; Germond 131, 159) Both Sekhmet and Bastet represent feline divinity, with the former a fierce lioness and the latter a gentle cat. (Germond 126) Horus, depicted with a falcon’s head, is the patron of the divine kingship in Egypt; while another bird-headed god, Thoth, is the divinity associated with academics, scribes and records, who takes notes and stands watch during the judgment process. (Germond 132-136). Sobek, a crocodile-headed figure, is seen as both fearsome and protective, a guardian of the Nile. (Germond 136-137)
The parallels between many of these divinities and the animals they are based on enhance the level of symbolism and meaning: “When the Egyptians selected an animal as a repository and expression of a divine power,” states Germond, “they naturally turned for inspiration to their immediate surroundings. Their choice of a lion or bull as the manifestation of the full force of the pantheon, or of the female hippopotamus as the symbol of motherhood and childbirth, was an indication of their desire to use familiar animals to express identifiable natural forces” (140). While figures like Seth depicted a fantastic creature, and the monster Ammut, which eats the hearts of those deemed unworthy of the afterlife, is a combination of a crocodile, a leopard, and a hippopotamus – three of the most feared animals in ancient Egypt (Karenga 2006, 140; Germond 260) – most of the symbolic animals were simple creatures given worthiness for their natural abilities. For example, the dung beetle, or scarab, has incredible symbolic significance in its actions. The ancient Egyptians were drawn to the way the scarab so diligently rolled its tiny ball of dung about, and marveled at the seemingly spontaneous appearance of tiny scarabs emerging from the ball later. The title of the beetle, khepri, derives from the word kheper, “becoming” (Germond 180). Thus the beetle is seen as a positive symbol of kheper in a society where agency – to go from whenen to kheper, being to becoming – is key: the beetle works hard and invests itself in creating what it wants, much like Ra at the beginning, and so too should people.
This level of unity with animals and understanding with nature seems almost completely absent in the larger, homogenous culture of today. The world exists seemingly to be polluted, plundered and destroyed for profit, and animals are rarely taken into account when it comes to the bigger schemes of people. Yet there are those who still make the case for the nobility of animals, as evidenced by the work of anthropologist Frans de Waal. de Waal makes the argument in his book, Primates and Philosophers: How Morality Evolved, for morality in animals – something that seems distinctly human – and how it might have come into being. In doing so, he looks at the social interactions of some of our closest primate relatives and counters “the idea that human morality is somehow at odds with our animal background, or even with nature in general” (161). His argument seems almost Maatian in naming the many traits human beings share with animals, making a connection back to our shared heritage in the natural world, to show examples of different emotional reactions he has observed in the animal kingdom, such as empathy, consolation behavior, gratitude, fairness and sympathy.
In conclusion, the Maatian ideal of worthiness before nature provides a window into the potential relationship the people of ancient Egypt had with the animals around them. Whether used as sources of food, companions, dangerous threats or symbols of divinity, animals hold a special place in the framework of life in Kemetic society, and are held in spiritual regard with their own inherent sacredness.
Works Cited
de Waal, Frans. Primates and Philosophers: How Morality Evolved. Ed. Stephen Macedo, Josiah Ober. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 2006. Print.
Germond, Philippe. An Egyptian Bestiary. Ed. Barbara Mellor. London: Thames and Hudson. 2001. Print.
Karenga, Maulana. Maat, The Moral Ideal in Ancient Egypt: A Study in Classical African Ethics. Los Angeles: University of Sankore Press. 2006. Print.
Karenga, Mauluna. Selections from the Husia: Sacred Wisdom of Ancient Egypt. Los Angeles: University of Sankore Press. 1984. Print.
Saleem, Ramses. The Illustrated Egyptian Book of the Dead. London: Godsfield Press. 2001. Print.
Ancient Egypt’s ethical thought and moral ideal were a basis for living a good life, with the emphasis not on promoting the self as much as making oneself worthy. In this, there are three main areas where one must prove his or her worth: worthiness before the Divine, worthiness before others, and worthiness before Nature. This third aspect, a factor missing from many of today’s mainstream religious ideologies, is a central part of the interrelated order of Maat, and not separate from the Divine nor from people; in this framework, humans are seen as inherently connected with nature. (Karenga 2006, 381) This extends to the relationship this moral ideal has between humans and the animals they share the world with, and shows a respect and understanding for the nature of animals. “Of all the civilizations in the ancient world,” opens the Forward of An Egyptian Bestiary, “none enjoyed such a close and significant relationship with the animal realm as that of the ancient Egyptians” (Germond 7).
These relations stem back to Kemetic theology, where the Creator invested himself in all that exists. As stated in the Book of Knowing and Creations, Ra describes how, by coming into being, “being itself came into being.” The passage further notes that Ra “came forth from among the plants…and created all things which creep and crawl and all that exists among them” (Karenga 1984, 5). Ra, being invested in all things, establishes the connection between the Divine and the natural. Humans find their place as fellow beings created by God, though unique in that they are made in Ra’s image – mi Ra, or like Ra. Yet unlike the Judeo-Christian traditions, this special status does not grant humans mastery of the world and its resources. Rather, there is a sense of the unity of being, a shared essence essentially binding all life together, and filial guardianship making it a crucial element to live in harmony with the natural world as much as with other people. (Karenga 2006, 385-387, 391) Ra cares for all life, and is praised in the Book of Prayers and Sacred Praises as one “who make people and birds to live, who supplies even food for mice in their holes as well as for worms and fleas” (Karenga 1984, 15).
Animals, recognized as being a part of the greater whole, were to be treated with some measure of respect. Many texts allude to the nobility of animals, such as Unas declaration in the Pyramid Texts stating that no person living or dead and no bird or beast accuses him. (Karenga 2006, 382) The Papyrus of the Royal Mother Nezemt contains confessions that state “I have not slaughtered the divine cattle of the temple” and “I have not cut the hair and skin of divine animals” (Saleem 115, 116). The Book of Coming Forth By Day also allude to the fair treatment of certain animals: “I have not snared sacred birds. I have not caught fish with the bait of their own bodies…I have not driven away cattle from the property of God” (Karenga 1984, 110).
While this does demonstrate a general respect for the well being of animals, it does not advocate certain inherent rights. For example, in the narrative of Djedi (Karenga 2006, 318-319), the sage stands up for the moral right of a prisoner to not be experimented on, but has no problem with a duck being presented to him as a test subject. This is because, while humans still share their world with nature and are a part of it, there is no denying their special status as images of God. (Karenga 2006, 388-389) Still, the concept of fairness remains. Fairness to humans and fairness to animals exist on different levels in Kemetic thought, and as stated above mistreatment of animals is frowned on. It is more akin to reckless behavior that threatens the future of human life and the environment. (Karenga 2006, 394, 395) Humans are expected to be filial guardians of the natural world, enjoying its gifts while at the same time recognizing their interrelated nature of the world, caring for it as a dutiful son or daughter might care for a parent. (Karenga 2006, 391-395)
In the spiritual and symbolic realm, animals played a major role as divine images and exemplified aspects of certain ethical concepts. Many of the Egyptian deities were conceived as beings that are part human and part animal, reflecting the interconnectedness between the two. As Philippe Germond states, “any tendency to favor only the human form of any given divinity, at the expense of the original animal form, would have been fundamentally at odds with the basic tenants of Egyptian thinking at the time” (121). These spiritual representations state how sacredness is not just a human aspect, but an expression of all living beings which are one in the Creator. (Karenga 2006, 387) This further distances Maatian ethics from mindsets setting humans far above animals, and supports the unity of being.
In the divine region, animals come to play as various gods and goddesses, aspects of Ra, who is in all things. Anubis, associated with funerary rights and the being that mans the Scales of Maat during judgment in the afterlife, bears the head of a jackal, thus making the jackal a divine representation of death. (Karenga 2006, 139; Germond 131, 159) Both Sekhmet and Bastet represent feline divinity, with the former a fierce lioness and the latter a gentle cat. (Germond 126) Horus, depicted with a falcon’s head, is the patron of the divine kingship in Egypt; while another bird-headed god, Thoth, is the divinity associated with academics, scribes and records, who takes notes and stands watch during the judgment process. (Germond 132-136). Sobek, a crocodile-headed figure, is seen as both fearsome and protective, a guardian of the Nile. (Germond 136-137)
The parallels between many of these divinities and the animals they are based on enhance the level of symbolism and meaning: “When the Egyptians selected an animal as a repository and expression of a divine power,” states Germond, “they naturally turned for inspiration to their immediate surroundings. Their choice of a lion or bull as the manifestation of the full force of the pantheon, or of the female hippopotamus as the symbol of motherhood and childbirth, was an indication of their desire to use familiar animals to express identifiable natural forces” (140). While figures like Seth depicted a fantastic creature, and the monster Ammut, which eats the hearts of those deemed unworthy of the afterlife, is a combination of a crocodile, a leopard, and a hippopotamus – three of the most feared animals in ancient Egypt (Karenga 2006, 140; Germond 260) – most of the symbolic animals were simple creatures given worthiness for their natural abilities. For example, the dung beetle, or scarab, has incredible symbolic significance in its actions. The ancient Egyptians were drawn to the way the scarab so diligently rolled its tiny ball of dung about, and marveled at the seemingly spontaneous appearance of tiny scarabs emerging from the ball later. The title of the beetle, khepri, derives from the word kheper, “becoming” (Germond 180). Thus the beetle is seen as a positive symbol of kheper in a society where agency – to go from whenen to kheper, being to becoming – is key: the beetle works hard and invests itself in creating what it wants, much like Ra at the beginning, and so too should people.
This level of unity with animals and understanding with nature seems almost completely absent in the larger, homogenous culture of today. The world exists seemingly to be polluted, plundered and destroyed for profit, and animals are rarely taken into account when it comes to the bigger schemes of people. Yet there are those who still make the case for the nobility of animals, as evidenced by the work of anthropologist Frans de Waal. de Waal makes the argument in his book, Primates and Philosophers: How Morality Evolved, for morality in animals – something that seems distinctly human – and how it might have come into being. In doing so, he looks at the social interactions of some of our closest primate relatives and counters “the idea that human morality is somehow at odds with our animal background, or even with nature in general” (161). His argument seems almost Maatian in naming the many traits human beings share with animals, making a connection back to our shared heritage in the natural world, to show examples of different emotional reactions he has observed in the animal kingdom, such as empathy, consolation behavior, gratitude, fairness and sympathy.
In conclusion, the Maatian ideal of worthiness before nature provides a window into the potential relationship the people of ancient Egypt had with the animals around them. Whether used as sources of food, companions, dangerous threats or symbols of divinity, animals hold a special place in the framework of life in Kemetic society, and are held in spiritual regard with their own inherent sacredness.
Works Cited
de Waal, Frans. Primates and Philosophers: How Morality Evolved. Ed. Stephen Macedo, Josiah Ober. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 2006. Print.
Germond, Philippe. An Egyptian Bestiary. Ed. Barbara Mellor. London: Thames and Hudson. 2001. Print.
Karenga, Maulana. Maat, The Moral Ideal in Ancient Egypt: A Study in Classical African Ethics. Los Angeles: University of Sankore Press. 2006. Print.
Karenga, Mauluna. Selections from the Husia: Sacred Wisdom of Ancient Egypt. Los Angeles: University of Sankore Press. 1984. Print.
Saleem, Ramses. The Illustrated Egyptian Book of the Dead. London: Godsfield Press. 2001. Print.